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bility Facility) funds earmarked to cover any inability 
to borrow on open markets (approximately 0.25trillion 
euro in AAA instruments and approaching 0.5trillion 
euro altogether) represent a very firm response and 
declaration that the euro area will not be allowed to 
collapse under the strain.
 We can now also see much of the regulatory 
response, both directly within the EU and orchestrat-
ed through the G20 and the Basel Committee, which 
will be implemented over the coming years to try to 
avoid a similar crisis in the future. The Basel Com-
mittee through ‘Basel III’ has addressed most of the 
more obvious problems for the prudential regulation 
of individual institutions. It has recognized that banks 
need both capital and liquidity buffers.1  Furthermore 
it has realized that if capital buffers are to be used 
to keep a bank going then the main buffer has to be 
ordinary equity, otherwise a bank has to be put into 
insolvency. Other buffers merely protect the senior 
creditors from loss, they do not protect the bank as a 
going concern. 
 Secondly, the EU has recognized that dealing 
with individual institutions is not enough and that risks 
in the system as a whole need to be assessed. The 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) that has re-
cently been set up should help assess such risks at 
both the country and EU-wide level. 
 Finally the EU has also recognized that there 
are very real problems in having national regulatory 
authorities and international financial institutions. Al-
though three new agencies have been created out of 
the ‘level 3’ committees for banking, securities mar-
kets and insurance, the EU has not taken the opportu-
nity to introduce EU-level bank regulation and supervi-
sion.
 The new system is therefore likely to have a 
number of important drawbacks, which will hamper 
its effectiveness in the future. We address just one of 
these here:
• the lack of agreement on an EU-level for 
bank regulation, deposit insurance and most im-
portantly resolution of problem banks.
 The drawback is particularly important as it re-
flects an inability to handle large (mainly cross-border) 
institutions. Since these institutions lie at the heart of 
the European financial system, this is a serious defi-
ciency.
 We end by considering some of the problems 
of transition from a crisis regime to normal arrange-
ments over the course of the coming years and the 
lack of tools for macro-prudential regulation.
Post-crisis Europe: Economic, Fiscal 
and Financial Prospects
Guest Editor Patrick Crowley
 Patrick M. Crowley is an international macro-
economist and Professor of economics at Texas A&M 
University in Corpus Christi, Texas, USA. He special-
izes in studies of regional integration, with particular 
emphasis on the European Union, and in frequency 
domain methods as applied to macroeconomic phe-
nomena. He has published widely in journals such as 
the Journal of Common Market Studies, the Journal of 
Economic Integration, the International Trade Journal, 
International Finance, and the Journal of Economic 
Surveys and has been the editor for several edited 
volumes on Europe, probably most notably the Rout-
ledge volume entitled Before and Beyond EMU which 
was published in 2002 and the Ashgate volume Cross-
ing the Atlantic which was published in 2004.  Crowley 
is currently co-chair of the economics interest sec-
tion of the European Union Studies Association of the 
US (along with David Mayes), and is also a Fellow of 
the Euro Area Business Cycle Network (EABCN).  In 
2004-2005 Crowley was a Visiting Research Scholar 
at the Bank of Finland (Suomen Pankki) in Helsinki, 
Finland, and has made  return visits during the sum-
mers of 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2010
The Response to the Evolving 
Financial Crisis in the EU
David G Mayes
 A year after the collapse of Lehman Broth-
ers and the high point of the global financial crisis it 
looked as if Europe was likely to come through the 
crisis relatively well. Iceland, Ireland, Latvia and the 
UK among others had been hard hit but for most 
countries the losses had been manageable. As 2010 
has developed, however, the euro area has started to 
encounter problems with Greece, Ireland, Spain and 
Portugal facing serious difficulty in raising funding on 
financial markets as the world economy seemed to be 
slowing down again and debt levels continued to rise 
rapidly. Hence, taking stock two years after Lehman, 
the prospect does not look quite so favorable, even 
though the size of the EFSF (European Financial Sta-
EUSA Review Forum
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The Handling of Large (Cross-Border) 
Institutions.
 The crisis has taught national authorities how 
smaller institutions need to be handled if their problems 
are to be resolved swiftly at minimum loss. The Bank-
ing Act 2009 in the UK is a clear example, as the UK 
needed to restructure its arrangements fundamentally 
following the deficiencies encountered when Northern 
Rock got into difficulty in September 2007 and could 
only be resolved by nationalization and hence a sub-
stantial commitment of taxpayers’ money. 
 The authorities need to step in early before the 
problems mount, taking over from the shareholders, 
whose claims are written down against the losses fol-
lowing an immediate assessment of the value of the 
bank. While a small bank can be simply placed in sol-
vency and insured depositors paid out immediately, it 
is normally a lower cost option to transfer the insured 
deposits and other viable parts of the business to one 
or more other providers according to who makes the 
best bid and leave the remainder in the ‘residual bank’ 
which is then wound up through normal insolvency. If 
there is not enough time to do this then all or part of 
the bank can be placed temporarily in a “bridge” bank 
run by the authorities until it can be resolved through 
transfer to other providers. The UK retained national-
ization as a last resort. Unless nationalization is used 
then this should be of no cost to the taxpayer as the 
deposit insurance fund would be financed by the in-
dustry (i.e. all depositors). It is only if the fund is insuf-
ficient and needs to borrow from the taxpayer in the 
short run or if the nationalized bank cannot be sold at 
a profit after reorganization that there should be tax-
payer costs. Many European countries did not have 
these powers, particularly to take over a bank prior 
to insolvency, and hence major changes have been 
necessary. Not all countries have acted and the result 
is likely to be considerable variation from one country 
to the next.
 While the majority of bank failures may have 
been in small institutions it is the difficulties in large 
institutions and their bailing out by the authorities that 
have created the pressures on national budgets and 
the build up of moral hazard for the future. In the main 
these bailouts have occurred not because this was the 
preferred policy but because there seemed to be no 
viable alternatives. There were two elements to the 
problem. The first was that the vital functions of the 
bank have to be kept running without interruption or 
there would be a serious disruption to the financial 
system and loss of confidence and the second that it 
is impossible to work out what needs to be done in a 
complex organization fast enough for it to be imple-
mented. Thus rather than simply the traditional epithet 
that these organizations were ‘too big to fail’, the prob-
lem was that they were too interconnected to fail or 
too complex to sort out. Thus a route has to be found 
which offers swift resolution at least partly as a going 
concern, without simply bailing out the existing share-
holders, although the amount of new equity required 
to return to adequate capitalization may in any event 
dilute the existing holdings to small proportions.
 The EU has only partly addressed this problem 
even at the national level. There is no clear agreement 
on whether there should be limits to the size and com-
plexity of institutions. The concept of ‘living wills’ has 
been promoted particularly in the UK. Under such a 
‘living will’ a bank has to explain how its vital functions 
can be kept running by the authorities, without the use 
of public money in the event that the organization fails 
to maintain adequate capital. This requires not just 
adequate simplification of structure that the different 
activities can be separated out and resolved but that 
there is adequate preparation so that these activities 
could be run in the new structure without a break in 
operation. Secondly, capital buffers need to be effec-
tive enough that they can absorb the shock. This can 
be achieved most readily, not simply by increasing 
their size, but by ensuring the most junior debt can 
be turned into equity, either if existing equity falls be-
low regulatory limits or if there is an economy wide 
crisis and markets are unlikely to be able to refinance 
the bank through a new capital injection. These con-
tingent contracts (CoCos) have already been used by 
the Lloyds Banking Group. There the trigger is falling 
below a 5% equity ratio.
 Thirdly, cushions need to be expanded in good 
times so that there is the scope to use them when the 
problem comes without immediately running down 
regulatory capital to the point that it does not meet the 
authorities’ minimum requirements. A counter-cyclical 
pressure against asset prices and credit growth was 
one of the strongest lessons from the crisis. The EU 
has not decided how to handle this yet.
 Once, however, we get to the case of a cross-
border institution there are two further problems. The 
first is simply that there is no one regulator who can 
sort the problems out and have the power to act. Na-
tional authorities in each jurisdiction need to act – in a 
cooperative manner. But the second problem is simply 
that the interests of the different member states may 
not be the same. The viability of the parent – i.e. the 
banking group as a whole might best be served by a 
rapid curtailing of activity among subsidiaries in other 
countries and a repatriation of capital. In a country 
with a predominantly foreign owned banking system 
this could be disastrous for financial and real stabil-
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ity. Some form of weighting of needs will be required. 
This is yet to be addressed. What has been addressed 
is burden sharing – having a priori agreements about 
how the cost to the taxpayer is to be shared out among 
the participant countries. This clearly adds moral haz-
ard.
 There is some hope of a move towards ad-
dressing the pan-EU spillover effects as the Com-
mission has proposed that each country should cre-
ate ‘resolution funds’ financed by the banking system 
that would handle to costs of resolution in addition to 
those encountered by the deposit insurance fund. It 
has been proposed to explore whether this could be 
applied at the EU level in 2014. However, the idea that 
there should be EU-level regulation for cross-border 
banks, EU-level supervision, EU-level resolution to 
get over the lack of powers across regimes or EU-lev-
el insurance has not been taken up. Analogously, the 
US had recognized this need in 1935 as a result of the 
Great Depression. The EU apparently is hoping that 
having supervisory colleges, soft law agreements and 
the ability of the new European Banking Agency to ar-
bitrate in the case of disagreement, will be sufficient.
The Return to ‘Normality’
 When the crisis struck in earnest after the fall 
of Lehman Brothers most EU countries introduced 
sweeping guarantees for depositors and other credi-
tors. Despite harsh criticism of Ireland which took the 
first step, deposit insurance was raised to €50,000 
and is set to move to €100,000 at the beginning of 
2011, thus enshrining a crisis measure and making 
the running of the normal system much more expen-
sive. Clearly there is a collective action problem and 
all countries will need to move back to normality in 
an organized way. Nevertheless there is no indication 
that previously financial stability was threatened by 
the failure to reimburse depositors beyond the rather 
low but variable limits that applied before the crisis.
 Timing of changes will be everything as the 
recovery itself has slowed down. One of the likely 
causes of the present crisis was the prolonged very 
low interest rates that followed the dotcom collapse 
and the 9/11 disruption. Holding off the return to nor-
mality too long could lead to another sharp cycle but 
returning too rapidly could push the EU back into re-
cession. The EU will probably not be the first mover 
in this regard internationally and at the time of writing 
there is a worry that there will be competitive attempts 
to push exchange rates down that will merely exacer-
bate the interest rate and imbalance problems.
The Lack of Tools for Macro-prudential 
Regulation
 Over the last five years there have been enor-
mous advances in the understanding of how connect-
ed the parts of the financial system are and the extent 
to which risks may be being concentrated rather than 
spread. However, analysis and action are not one and 
the same. Central banks typically have responsibility 
for macro-prudential stability but they cannot exercise 
that responsibility if they only have the tools of mone-
tary policy. Sometimes the needs of price stability and 
financial stability may point in the same direction but 
they need not. Using interest rates to restrain financial 
growth may not be appropriate if there is no general 
inflationary pressure. Tools are required that impinge 
on lending activity and asset prices, either automati-
cally or on a discretionary basis. Loan to value ratios 
are a commonly cited possibility. If asset prices start 
rising then new loans should represent a decreasing 
portion of that rise.
 As it is, the new ESRB will have good resourc-
es for analysis but it can only warn and recommend 
action by the national authorities. The idea is that if 
an authority does not carry out the recommendations 
it would have to explain and that this process would 
give moral pressure for action. There are two dangers 
to this process. The first is that it is very easy to pro-
duce a long set of risks and to caution people against 
them. This can readily devalue the message. The ECB 
has produced annual assessments of public finances 
among the member states, with matching cautions 
and calls for action. The impact of these became very 
limited. The second is that without the responsibility 
to act itself it will be rather easier for any of the par-
ties to defer action. The ESRB will not wish to have 
its authority challenged which might occur if it tries to 
push for more action than the states concerned feel is 
merited.
Concluding Remark
 The response of the EU to the challenges of 
the crisis has in many respects been more radical 
than expected, especially the creation of the EFSF. 
However, despite the creation of new EU-level institu-
tions including the ESRB, the EU has not tackled the 
problem of having cross-border banks that proved too 
big to handle satisfactorily head on. It has analyzed 
the problems clearly but hopes that international co-
ordination and cooperation, coupled with some sim-
plification of the institutions themselves and a clear 
increase in the capital and liquidity buffers required 
will be sufficient. A likely outcome is that the system 
will not be tested and none of the major banks will 
get into irresolvable trouble once the present crisis is 
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past. However, it was this perseverance with a sys-
tem that was not plausible that led to the problems in 
Iceland and the practical difficulties over coordination 
that led to the dispute over Fortis. It was only where 
the home country firmly tackled the problems without 
recourse to partner countries as with RBS and Lloyds 
that the system ‘worked’ but there the taxpayer – thus 
far - has paid. There is a reasonable chance that, as 
in the Nordic crisis, the taxpayer losses may fall and in 
some countries the taxpayer may come out ahead in 
simple fiscal sense. Nevertheless this is an opportu-
nity missed and a worry for the future. If a problem on 
this scale does not prompt a comprehensive EU level 
solution one might wonder what will.
David G Mayes, University of Auckland
Notes
1 The Basel Committee recognized that an agreement on 
liquidity buffers was needed even when it was negotiating 
the first accord in the 1980s but it proved too difficult to get 
agreement and unfortunately as a consequence the whole 
topic was seriously neglected.
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Lisbon Agenda Performance: OECD Measures
David L. Cleeton
 The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) is comprised of 33 member 
countries including 21 of the EU 27 member states.1 
For over four decades the reliability of OECD data for 
comparative economic and social analysis has been 
unrivaled and the recent compendium of OECD statis-
tics in the OECD Factbook 2010 and its accompany-
ing database2  has been chosen as the source for an 
exercise in assessing the relative performance of EU 
member states vis-à-vis the economic performance 
standards exemplified by the United States and Ja-
pan.
Growth Rates in Labor Productivity
 The single measure most often used to evalu-
ate the dynamic efficiency of an economy is the growth 
rate of labor productivity and most often GDP per hour 
worked is the chosen empirical measure of labor pro-
ductivity.  The growth rate of GDP per capita worked 
is then typically broken down into two components: 
changes in labor productivity itself, the rate of increase 
in GDP per hour worked, and changes in the utilization 
of labor, that is hours worked per capita.  For compar-
ative purposes the OECD data has been converted to 
constant US dollars using Purchasing Power Parities 
indices with the year 2000 as the base.   On the follow-
ing page Chart 1 gives a summary of the comparative 
data for the period 2001-08.
 The bottom panel of the chart shows the growth 
rate in GDP per capita.  The bars represent the average 
annual growth rate over the period 2001-07 and the 
triangles show the beginning of the recessionary pe-
riod of 2007-08.  In general the 2007-08 performance 
was below the longer-term trend established earlier in 
the decade, e.g. Estonia and Ireland stand out in lead-
ing the recessionary decline.  In the rankings the top 
overall growth performances were established by the 
strong continued performance of EU accession coun-
tries.  Estonia, the Slovak and Czech Republics, Po-
land, Slovenia, and Hungary posted respectively the 
highest average growth rates.  In fact only the Franco-
German core and their surrounding smaller neighbors 
and the laggard southern economies of Italy and Por-
tugal failed to exceed the growth rate performance of 
the United States.
 When we take account of the growth of labor 
utilization, the growth of labor productivity relative to 
the US and Japan is less impressive.  Over the 2001-
07 period there was a significant fall in labor utilization 
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in both the US and Japan: a decline of 4/10ths of 1 
percent per year in hours worked per capita.  The only 
country with a comparable rate of decline was France 
with 3/10ths of 1 percent per year.  Portugal suffered 
a larger downward rate of labor utilization posting a 
decline of 9/10ths of 1 percent per year.  At the other 
extreme Estonia, the Slovak Republic, Poland, Hun-
gary and Greece all saw annual growth rates in hours 
worked per capita in excess of 1 and ¼ percent per 
year over the 2001-07 period.
 After adjusting for changes in hours worked 
per capita the growth of labor productivity in 11 EU 
countries exceed the average annual growth rate of 
2.1 percent set by both the US and Japanese econo-
mies.  The high relative performances are tabled be-
low.
Table 1: Growth Rates in GDP per Hour Worked
   
Country  2001-2007 2007-2008 
Estonia   6.1  -2.3 
Slovak Republic  5.6  3.9 
Czech Republic  4.1  0.9 
Poland   3.3  1.6 
Slovenia   4.0  0.7 
Hungary   2.5  1.9 
Greece   2.3  1.9 
Ireland   3.0  -0.7 
Finland   2.2  -0.3 
Sweden   2.6  -1.7 
United Kingdom  2.1  1.2 
Japan   2.1  0.5 
United States  2.1  1.4 
OECD   1.9  0.4 
EU27   1.5  0.1 
 This relative performance record for the most 
part is consistent with economic convergence in the 
process of integrating new EU member states.  It is 
not however what one would have expected to see 
through the fulfilment of the goals established under 
the Lisbon Agenda and summarized below.3 
a new strategic goal for the next decade: to become 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world capable of sustainable econom-
ic growth with more and better jobs and greater social 
cohesion. Achieving this goal requires an overall strat-
egy aimed at:
 preparing the transition to a knowledge-based 
economy and society by better policies for the infor-
mation society and R&D, as well as by stepping up 
the process of structural reform for competitiveness 
and innovation and by completing the internal mar-
ket;
 modernising the European social model, in-
vesting in people and combating social exclusion;
 sustaining the healthy economic outlook and 
favourable growth prospects by applying an appro-
priate macro-economic policy mix.
Contributions to GDP Growth
 A different measurement approach which fo-
cuses on the emphasis placed on the innovative pro-
cesses tied to the knowledge-based economy and the 
information society is offered in the analysis conducted 
by the OECD on the topic of productivity and growth 
accounting.  In growth accounting, GDP growth is fur-
ther decomposed into the contributions of labor and 
capital inputs and multifactor productivity, or how the 
production knowledge base and inter-factor productiv-
ity improves over time.  More recently there has been 
an effort undertaken to breakout alternative forms of 
capital investment.  Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) capital includes the categories of in-
vestment in computer hardware and software as well 
as communications equipment.  Under the OECD clas-
sification scheme, non-ITC capital is comprised pri-
marily of categories spanning investments in transport 
equipment and non residential construction; products 
of agriculture, metal products and machinery other 
than computer hardware and communications equip-
ment; and other products of non residential gross fixed 
capital formation.
 Using these categories, the OECD has es-
timated the contributions to GDP growth associated 
with changes in the labor input, ICT capital, non-ITC 
capital, and the residual multi-factor productivity com-
ponent.  The time period used by this recent OECD 
study is longer term than the period under the Lisbon 
Agenda, covering nearly a quarter of a century.  This 
prevents the inclusion of Baltic and Central and East-
ern European countries which have only relatively re-
cently joined the OECD.   
 The results are summarized in Table 2 and in 
Chart 2 on the following pages.  The examination of 
the contributions of ICT capital to GDP growth shows 
two cluster groups in comparison to the reference tar-
gets set by the US and Japan.  Japan’s 4/10ths of 1 
percent (0.40) annual growth rate contribution from 
ICT capital is beaten by a total of five EU countries 
but three, Denmark (0.42), the Netherlands (0.45) and 
Belgium (0.46) underperform vis-à-vis the US (0.54). 
Both the United Kingdom (0.55) and Sweden (0.56) 
marginally outperform the US in terms of ICT capital 
contributions.
 In fact both Sweden and the United Kingdom 
managed to outperform the US in the categories of 
ITC capital, non-ITC capital, and multi-factor produc-
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tivity.  However their overall GDP growth performances 
still fell short of the US’s record because of the signifi-
cantly larger contribution of labor.
 Denmark, the Netherlands, and Belgium all fell 
behind Japan in the measured contributions to GDP 
growth from non-ITC capital and multi-factor produc-
tivity.  Japan was the only country in the study to see 
a decline in the labor input over the comparison period 
while Denmark and Belgium showed weak labor input 
growth and the Netherlands demonstrated strong la-
bor input growth comparable to the highest level dem-
onstrated by the growth of the US labor input.  Over-
all the combined effects were that Japan was able to 
produce significantly better overall GDP growth than 
Denmark and slightly inferior growth than Belgium. 
The Netherlands on the other hand came in with the 
strongest EU member state performance with an an-
nual overall GDP growth rate of 2.77 compared to 2.89 
posted by the US.  
Table 2: Contributions to GDP Growth
Average annual growth in percentage, 1985-2008        
(or closest comparable period) 
   Labor  ICT  Non-ICT    Multi-factor
  input capital capital       productivity
Germany -0.16 0.29 0.31        1.07
Italy  0.35 0.35 0.71       0.22
Denmark 0.29 0.42 0.35  0.64
France  0.03 0.24 0.31  1.16
Spain  0.67 0.25 0.54  0.30
Japan  -0.34 0.40 0.45  1.60
Austria  0.60 0.21 0.18  1.22
Belgium 0.22 0.46 0.28  1.30
Sweden 0.17 0.56 0.35  1.24
Portugal 0.32 0.36 0.48  1.26
Finland -0.22 0.36 0.29  2.04
U.K.  0.45 0.55 0.40  1.27
Netherlands 0.85 0.45 0.39  1.07
US  0.94 0.54 0.32  1.09
Ireland  1.68 0.21 0.62  3.33
 1 
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Unit Labor Costs
 Our third measure looks at the overall competi-
tiveness of a country through the examination of unit 
labor costs.  Unit labor costs are codetermined by the 
dynamics of labor compensation and labor productiv-
ity and serve as the primary determinant of cost pres-
sures on producer prices.  Typically unit labor costs 
are defined as the average labor cost per unit of ag-
gregate output or the ratio of total labor costs to total 
output on either a per worker or per worker hours ba-
sis.
 Using data over the decade of 1998-2008, the 
OECD reports average annual growth rates in unit la-
bor costs and productivity as summarized in Chart 3 
and Table 3. Japan clearly sets the standard over the 
decade for labor cost driven competitiveness.  While 
GDP growth was negatively affected by a large de-
cline in labor utilization in the Japanese economy this 
does not impact in the same way on unit labor costs. 
In fact with labor productivity growth in the mid to low 
range of the group of most developed economies, it 
is the decade-long strong wage restraint seen in the 
Japanese economy that is the primary driver of the 
significant downturn in unit labor costs.  The only other 
economy with sufficient wage restraint matching pro-
ductivity growth over the decade is Germany which 
manages to hold growth in unit labor costs to nearly 
zero. 
 Over this decade, among the candidate and 
later accession countries of EU, most economies saw 
strong gains in labor productivity.  Poland, the Czech 
and Slovak Republics, Slovenia, Estonia, and Hunga-
ry along with Ireland all saw average annual produc-
tivity gains in excess of 2.5 percent while Japan and 
the United States respectively recorded 1.43 and 1.74 
percent growth rates.  Due to even higher growth rates 
in labor compensation, unit labor costs rose by more 
than in the United States in all these countries, with 
the exception of Poland.
Conclusion
 In the comparative OECD data we have ex-
amined on labor productivity, growth accounting, and 
labor costs there is no strong support for the achieve-
ment of the primary Lisbon Agenda goal of “becoming 
the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
economy in the world capable of sustainable econom-
ic growth”.  The driving force of ITC capita investment 
shows up primarily in maintaining the relative perfor-
mance vis-à-vis Japan and the US of a small set of 
mid-sized economies located around the Franco-Ger-
man core.  In terms of economic growth convergence 
in matching the performances of the Japanese and 
US economies, the data shows this to be localized re-
gionally in the combination of labor productivity gains 
and increased labor utilization rates across recent EU 
accession countries.
David L. Cleeton, Christopher Newport University
Notes
1 Countries which share OECD and EU membership are:  
Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Re-
public, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
2 The OECD Factbook 2010: Economic, Environmen-
tal and Social Statistics (May 2010) can be accessed 
online at: http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/oecd-
factbook_18147364.  The website access allows the 
downloading of Adobe Acrobat versions of the chapters 
and subsections of the publication along with Excel files 
containing the data used to produce the publication’s 
tables, charts, and graphs.
3 From the Lisbon European Council 23-24 March 2000 
Presidency Conclusions, see: http://www.europarl.europa.
eu/summits/lis1_en.htm
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Commentary on the SGP Reform Proposals
Andrew Hughes Hallett
 Prior to the financial crisis in September 2008, 
public finances in the European Union (EU), including 
countries in the euro area, appeared to be in reason-
able shape. In fact, the average budget deficit-to-GDP 
ratio was close to 3%, and the average government 
debt-to-GDP ratio was around 60%. In other words, 
for the EU taken as a whole, fiscal policy had been 
conducted more or less in line with the limits of the 
Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).   
 However, over the last couple of years, the 
stance of fiscal policy has deteriorated. Public finances 
(across the globe) are now in worse shape than ever 
during peace time, and fiscal policy is on an unsus-
tainable path nearly everywhere. The budgetary crisis 
in Europe has received most attention, not least due 
to the desperate situation in Greece, but it is notewor-
thy that public finances in Europe overall are stronger 
than in the UK, USA and Japan (Buiter, 2010). 
 Behind the average figures for the European 
Union - a public debt ratio of more than 80% and a def-
icit ratio of nearly 7% - significant differences can be 
found between the member states. For example, Fin-
land has relatively strong public finances; whereas the 
so-called PIIGS group (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece 
and Spain) have very high debt and deficit ratios. And 
in between are Germany and the Netherlands, al-
though with public finances not yet strong enough to 
satisfy the Maastricht criteria. 
 There are several reasons for this dramatic 
worsening of public finances in recent years. One is 
clearly the direct increase in public expenditures as-
sociated with various rescue packages for banks and 
other financial institutions following the financial crisis. 
Another reason is the indirect rise in expenditures and 
fall in revenues due to the operation of automatic sta-
bilisers following the economic downturn that came in 
the wake of the financial crisis. And most obviously, 
public revenues have fallen as a result of the slimming 
down of the housing and financial sectors, and the 
consequent loss of output and employment that fol-
lowed over the last two years. 
 The fiscal misery may have serious economic 
consequences. First, high deficit and debt ratios may 
lead to dramatically increasing risk premia on interest 
rates, reflecting the risk of sovereign default, which in 
turn may not only reinforce the fiscal troubles but also 
would be harmful to private investment etc. Second, 
there is growing evidence that debt ratios above 90% 
may adversely affect economic growth (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009, Checherita and Rother, 2010). In fact, 
recent projections made by the IMF (2010) forecast 
even US and UK debt-to-GDP ratios to exceed 90% 
by 2011.
 Against that background, it is understandable 
that there should be concerns about explosive debt 
developments. While simple in principle, it seems dif-
ficult for the euro area members to implement the fis-
cal pain needed to bring their public finances in or-
der: governments hesitate to raise taxes and/or cut 
expenditures. This reflects a populist attitude of “won’t 
pay” rather than “can’t pay” which might, in a longer 
term perspective, pose a threat to the survival of the 
euro. So, there seems to be a need for a new policy 
framework which (a) allows for short-term stabilisation 
and consolidation policies to be undertaken, (b) allows 
policy-makers to choose a size of the public sector as 
they want and (c) constrains the behaviour of fiscal 
authorities so as to avoid unsustainable fiscal policies 
in the future.
 The research we have done is concerned with 
a framework for setting fiscal and monetary policies 
in Europe, but we take on board the need for, and the 
difficulties caused by how those policies interact with, 
policies for structural reform.  We treat the policy mak-
ing framework in general, rather than the detail of how 
different policies might be devised to suit particular 
circumstances. We use that framework to show how 
different policy institutions may be allowed to retain 
different priorities, and hence individual policies that fit 
together, while also maintaining a degree of flexibility 
that allows them to deal with problems as they arise. 
At the same time, policymakers need to remain inde-
pendent of external influences (and political pressures 
in particular) so that their policies will remain consis-
tent in the pursuit of the goals that they or society have 
set for them.
 Our argument is as follows. The fiscal rules 
stipulated in the Stability and Growth Pact have 
proved impossible to enforce, and the Pact has now 
effectively been set aside. However, to avoid unsus-
tainable fiscal policies reappearing and to prevent 
monetary policy from being undermined by self-inter-
ested governments, there is still a need for a new and 
agreed fiscal framework within the euro area. In or-
der to achieve the necessary co-ordination between 
monetary and fiscal policies, this paper suggests an 
intertemporal assignment with fiscal leadership, in 
the sense of first satisfying medium-to-long-term ob-
jectives (e.g., providing for social security, the public 
provision of education and research activities, and en-
suring the sustainability of public spending), and let-
ting monetary policy focus on short run objectives (cy-
clical stabilisation, control of inflation). We argue that 
restraints on fiscal policy should focus on imbalances, 
and not on the size of the public sector or on the com-
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position of expenditures and revenues. Specifically, 
we suggest public debt targets as a practical way to 
achieve this and enhance fiscal-monetary co-ordina-
tion at the same time without having to compromise 
the independence of monetary policy. An excessive 
debt protocol is proposed to give concrete form to this 
targeting arrangement, and a mechanism is devised 
to identify the region of stabilisability within which that 
debt target must be set (and hence the critical limits 
beyond which debt may not go without precipitating a 
crisis). 
 Making these factors explicit components of the 
new fiscal framework, together with an independent 
monitoring body, would do a lot to improve the cred-
ibility of the Euro area’s fiscal policies, and to reduce 
risk premia in borrowing costs. Stabilising the stock 
of debt by fiscal means alone is not always possible 
however. We therefore also examine the role of “inter-
nal devaluations”, or structural reforms, as a means 
of circumventing those barriers to fiscal stability. This 
framework provides the analytic support needed to 
underpin many of the innovations currently under dis-
cussion in Brussels.
Andrew Hughes Hallett, George Mason University
Fiscal Discipline is Not Enough 
to Stabilize the Euro1
Erik Jones
 By the time you read this essay, the Task Force 
headed by European Council President Herman Van 
Rompuy will have already delivered its recommenda-
tions for the reform of European macroeconomic gov-
ernance. Most likely, those recommendations will in-
clude a mixture of tougher sanctions on countries that 
run ‘excessive deficits’ on their government balances 
and flanking measures to keep an eye on national 
competitiveness as well. The Germans will express 
disappointment that the regime is not more rigorous; 
a few of the smaller countries will worry that the sanc-
tions will only apply to them; the European Commis-
sion will complain that its advice is not given sufficient 
prominence; and the European Central Bank (ECB) 
will make known its disappointment that the proce-
dures (and sanctions) are not more automatic.
 This focus on fiscal discipline is understand-
able given what has happened in Greece. The idea 
that the Germans (and the Slovaks) should have to 
bail out a Greek government that cannot keep its own 
house in order is hard to sell to the tabloid press.  The 
prospect that Greece is only one of many governments 
in need of fiscal support is even worse.  Public opinion 
across the eurozone demands reassurance that this is 
a once-in-a-lifetime experience and that those respon-
sible for this mess will never be able to repeat their 
mistakes.  Contrition on the part of those countries at 
the heart of the crisis is not enough to satisfy and an-
gry electorate; something more must be done.
 If the European Council (or the Council of 
the European Union) chooses to implement the Van 
Rompuy Task Force’s recommendations, that will rep-
resent an improvement over the Stability and Growth 
Pact. Member States will pay more attention to the im-
portance of adhering to fiscal targets (using accepted 
government accounting standards) and they will have 
cause to reinvigorate the wider process of multilateral 
surveillance as well. Nevertheless, if the goal of the 
reforms is to prevent another crisis like the one we 
have witnessed over the last year or so, then they 
will fail.  Fiscal discipline is not enough to prevent the 
emergence and implosion of destabilizing asset bub-
bles and the loss of competitiveness in the peripheral 
countries of the eurozone is only a symptom, not a 
cause. The Van Rompuy Task Force is well aware of 
the underlying mechanisms and yet chosen not to ad-
EUSA Political Economy
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dress them. The stability of the eurozone is likely to 
remain much weaker than it should be as a result.
Interest Rate Convergence and 
Macroeconomic Imbalances
 To understand this critique of the likely trajec-
tory for European macroeconomic governance reform, 
it is necessary to start with the phenomenon of inter-
est rate convergence that took place just before the 
creation of Europe’s economic and monetary union 
(and well before the introduction of the euro). At some 
point in the mid-to-late 1990s, bond traders in Eu-
rope awoke to the realization that there would be only 
one interest rate prevailing across the eurozone as a 
whole. The situation prior to EMU was markedly differ-
ent. Some countries had relatively high interest rates 
(Portugal, Greece, Spain, Italy, etc.) while other coun-
tries benefited from interest rates that were relatively 
low (Germany, Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, etc.). 
Expressed in terms of bond prices the situation was 
reversed: prices were high where interest rates were 
low and the other way around. Hence these bond trad-
ers saw an opportunity for profit from selling high and 
buying low – trading some of their holdings of German, 
Dutch, Austrian or Belgian bonds for cheaper assets in 
Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain, and so forth.
 Once bond traders began to develop strategies 
based on this insight, their prophecy of interest-rate 
convergence was self-fulfilling. As demand increased 
for the higher interest-rate bonds, the price of these 
bonds rose from their initially low levels. The reverse 
was also true, and bond prices fell where interest rates 
were low (albeit only marginally given the relative size 
of the different bond markets). A convergence in bond 
yields or effective interest rates across the two differ-
ent countries was the result. This interest rate con-
vergence was not a wholly psychological proposition. 
There had to be some justification to be found in the 
economic fundamentals for the relative price move-
ments to take place. The actions of the bond traders 
only succeeded in speeding up matters. Once they 
became convinced about what would happen in the 
future, their actions created those conditions in the 
present. The speed of this convergence is evident in 
one of the data lines presented Figure 1 – the dashed 
line that shows the standard deviation across ten-year 
government bond yields in those countries that would 
constitute to the eurozone (including Greece but ex-
cluding Luxembourg). As that standard deviation de-
creases, the separate national interest rates come to-
gether.
 1 
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Figure 1:  Interest Rate Convergence and Macroeconomic Imbalances
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Long-term Interest Rates
Current Account Balances
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 The process of interest rate convergence prior 
to the start of Europe’s economic and monetary union 
(EMU) is well known. What is less appreciated is what 
this interest-rate convergence entailed in terms of in-
ternational capital flows. As money moved from high 
price to low price bonds, it crossed international bor-
ders as well. Governments that once struggled to meet 
their borrowing requirements at a reasonable cost 
benefited from a release of pressure; local banks and 
industries that saw their activities crowded out – or, 
better, priced out – by government borrowing, experi-
enced a release of pressure as well. This private sec-
tor impact came not only from the activity in the bond 
market but also from the liberalization of international 
capital markets that ran alongside the creation of the 
monetary union. Hence the movement of money in the 
bond market was shadowed by cross-border depos-
its and interbank lending in search of a higher yield. 
All things being equal, the use of credit expanded in 
those countries where the cost of borrowing fell.
 Where money flows, goods follow. The coun-
tries that borrowed saw an increase in both consump-
tion and investment that drew in imports beyond the 
pace of any export growth. Hence even where coun-
tries continued to hold onto market share in the out-
side world, their current account balances plunged 
into deficit. The experience of lending countries was 
exactly the opposite. The capital (bond holdings, bank 
deposits, etc.) that left the typically low interest rate 
countries like Germany, Austria, Belgium and the 
Netherlands, put upward pressure on their current ac-
counts. With more money being saved than invested 
in these countries, the relative balance between do-
mestic output and domestic absorption had to be posi-
tive. These effects can be seen in Figure 1 as well. 
The relevant (solid) data line shows the standard de-
viation across national current accounts expressed as 
a percent of gross domestic product (GDP). As this 
measure increases, national current account positions 
diverge and the macroeconomic relationship between 
savings and investment within and across countries 
moves further out of balance.
Competitiveness
 The emergence of increasing macroeconomic 
imbalances fuelled a heated debate on competitive-
ness in Europe. In that debate – which is still very 
much ongoing – those countries that run surpluses 
are lauded for their low cost structures; those that run 
deficits are criticized for their high costs. The point to 
note, however, is that it was the divergence in current 
account performance that preceded the debate on 
competitiveness and not the other way around. Rela-
tive cost structures did not cause the convergence 
of nominal interest rates in Europe. On the contrary, 
nominal interest rate convergence took place despite 
differences in relative cost structures and price infla-
tion rates. In turn, it was the capital flows that attended 
nominal interest rate convergence that caused cur-
rent account performance to diverge across countries. 
Contrary to the rule of thumb used in international eco-
nomics, goods markets accommodated; capital mar-
kets cleared first.
 This is not to say, however, that the competi-
tiveness debate is unfounded. Relative cost structures 
have moved during course of Europe’s economic and 
monetary union and their movement has reinforced – 
or, perhaps better, locked in – the wide divergences in 
current account balances. Countries on the southern 
periphery of EMU may not have run deficits because 
of their unfavorable cost structures, but they will find 
it difficult to close those deficits with the relative cost 
disadvantages they have developed alongside the de-
terioration on their current accounts. The expansion 
of credit that coincided with the process of nominal 
interest rate convergence put upward pressure on 
prices as well as imports. With more governments, 
firms and individuals borrowing for consumption and 
investment, the growth in domestic demand necessar-
ily outpaced the growth in output (or supply). The in-
fluence of this pressure was restrained by the policies 
of the monetary union. Compared to their own histori-
cal performance, inflation in the peripheral countries 
of the eurozone actually slowed down. Nevertheless, 
their price inflation was higher than elsewhere – both 
because capital imports drove prices up on the periph-
ery and because net capital exports in Germany and 
elsewhere drove prices there down.
 The distinction I am trying to make here is 
subtle rather than self-evident and it depends in many 
ways upon how competitiveness is measured. Econo-
mists believe the best measure of competitiveness is 
found in relative nominal unit labor costs expressed 
in common currency. If we can assume that the ‘units’ 
are roughly equivalent from one place to the next, then 
the cost of labor required to make those units should 
give us a good indication of where production is likely 
to be expensive and where it is not. Even if the units 
are not exactly fungible, the relative movement in cost 
structures over time should give us a clear indication 
of which countries are losing competitiveness and 
which countries are gaining.
 The problem is that relative movements in 
nominal unit labor costs are not directly observable. 
Instead, they have to be calculated using three differ-
ent elements:
* the relative movements in the ratio of total la-
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bor costs to total output, which is called ‘real’ unit labor 
costs because the price movements common to both 
parts of the ratio cancel out;
* the relative movements in the price deflators 
for gross domestic product (GDP) so that the ‘units’ of 
output can be held constant; and,
* the movements in nominal effective exchange 
rates so that the influence of currency movements can 
be taken into account.
 Each of these observable variables sheds light 
on a different aspect of the competitiveness story. 
Movements in real unit labor costs tell us about the 
relative changes in the distribution of income between 
capital and labor; movements in GDP price deflators 
tell us about relative price changes across the econ-
omy as a whole; and movements in nominal effective 
exchange rates tell us about relative currency move-
ments across the range of trading partners. By look-
ing at these different elements separately, rather than 
aggregating them altogether into one composite mea-
sure of competitiveness, it is easier to get a sense of 
which aspect is behind any movement in the final ag-
gregate and what should be done about it. 
 Table 1 illustrates the statistical decomposition 
of national competitiveness, using data that compares 
in-country developments with the other first fifteen 
European Union (EU) member states (EU-15) but 
excluding tiny Luxembourg. The product of all three 
observable variables is called the ‘real effective ex-
change rate’; ‘nominal unit labor costs’ are calculating 
by multiplying relative real unit labor costs and relative 
GDP price deflators. Because the table reproduces 
log changes over different period, the rates of change 
are additive rather than multiplicative across the dif-
ferent component variables. The periods run from the 
negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty (1991) to the start 
of EMU (I use 2000 to split the difference between 
Greece and everyone else); from the start of EMU to 
the onset of the global financial crisis (2007); and from 
the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty to the onset of 
the global financial crisis. Again, because the data re-
port log differences, the long period is simply the sum 
of the two shorter ones.
 Looking at the first (pre-single currency) pe-
riod, Germany, Greece and Portugal lost competi-
tiveness through a real appreciation of the real effec-
tive exchange rate while Ireland, Spain, and Italy all 
saw competitiveness improve as their real effective 
exchange rates appreciated. The point to note, how-
ever, is that these movements took place for differ-
ent reasons. Germany lost competitiveness primarily 
because of the rise in real unit labor costs insofar as 
the appreciation of the nominal effective exchange 
rate is more than offset by the relatively slow growth 
in the GDP price deflator. Greece and Portugal lost 
competitiveness because relative price inflation more 
than offset the depreciation of the nominal effective 
exchange rate; by comparison, relative movements in 
real unit labor costs only added insult to injury. Among 
those countries that witnessed competitiveness gains, 
Ireland is the mirror image of Germany in that move-
ments in relative real unit labor costs more than made 
up for a relative high rate of GDP price inflation. Spain’s 
competitiveness gains were due wholly to relative 
movement in nominal effective exchange rates. Italy’s 
gains where due to a combination of relative nominal 
depreciation and relative reductions in real unit labor 
costs.
 With the introduction of the single currency, 
relative movements in the nominal effective exchange 
rate flatten out and appreciate marginally for those 
countries within the single currency against those 
countries that chose to remain outside. Hence any 
changes in the real effective exchange rate are the 
result of changes in relative nominal unit labor costs 
– which is to say either relative GDP price deflators or 
relative real unit labor costs. For Germany, both vari-
ables move in the same direction as price changes 
slow down relative to everywhere else and as relative 
wage costs decrease as a proportion of total output. 
Where German relative real unit labor costs return to 
their pre-Maastricht position, relative GDP price infla-
tion drops even further in the second period than in the 
first. The other countries all experience an increase in 
relative nominal unit labor costs due primarily to rela-
tively high rates of GDP price inflation – which are con-
siderably lower than during the first period (except in 
Spain) and yet which are still higher than in Germany. 
Relative real unit labor costs only rise in the two coun-
tries where they fell dramatically prior to monetary 
union (Ireland and Italy) and then only enough partly 
to offset the competitiveness gains made in the previ-
ous period. In Spain, relative real unit labor costs fall in 
the second period to offset the country’s relatively high 
rate of inflation.
 This is a complicated story with a simple con-
clusion. The difference between Germany’s gain and 
the other countries’ losses since the start of monetary 
union is due primarily to relative rates of GDP price 
inflation. The variation in relative performance in terms 
of other variables diminished considerably across 
countries from one period to the next. Hence, so far as 
competitiveness is concerned, the only thing that mat-
ter is that relative price inflation fell in Germany and 
it rose everywhere else. So long as Europe’s macro-
economic imbalances are allowed to continue, that dif-
ference in relative rates of GDP price inflation is only 
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EUSA REVIEW – Fall 2010   Table 1: Competitiveness in the Eurozone Percent Change REER (A+B+C) NEER (A) GDP Def (B) RULC (C) NULC (B+C) 
1991-2000 Germany 4.3 6.3 -7.3 5.3 -2.0 Ireland -5.2 -4.4 15.3 -16.1 -0.8 Greece 16.7 -38.6 52.9 2.4 55.2 Spain -13.0 -26.1 13.9 -0.8 13.1 Italy -25.3 -26.0 11.5 -10.9 0.6 Portugal 21.3 -10.0 22.4 8.9 31.3 
2000-2007 Germany -12.3 2.5 -9.1 -5.7 -14.8 Ireland 14.0 3.5 6.6 3.8 10.5 Greece 8.8 0.7 7.6 0.5 8.1 Spain 11.1 1.9 13.0 -3.8 9.2 Italy 10.8 2.0 3.8 5.1 8.8 Portugal 6.2 1.9 4.6 -0.2 4.3 
1991-2007 Germany -8.0 8.8 -16.3 -0.4 -16.7 Ireland 8.8 -0.9 21.9 -12.2 9.7 Greece 25.4 -37.9 60.5 2.9 63.3 Spain -1.9 -24.2 26.9 -4.5 22.3 Italy -14.5 -24.0 15.3 -5.8 9.5 Portugal 27.5 -8.2 27.0 8.6 35.6 Note: REER is real effective exchange rate; NEER is nominal effective exchange rate; GDP def is price deflator for gross domestic product; RULC is real unit labor cost; NULC is nominal unit labor cost.  All data are log changes over the period expressed as percent.  Each variable is calculated relative to EU 15 excluding Luxembourg.  An upward movement in the REER constitutes a lost of competitiveness.  Source: Own calculations based on data provided in the AMECO database of the European Commission 
– latest revision Spring 2010.  
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going to increase and the competitiveness problem 
in countries like Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portugal and 
Spain is only going to get worse. The point to note, 
however, is that changes in competitiveness are only 
the symptom of the problem; the capital flows in re-
sponse to anticipated interest rate convergence are 
the cause.
Conclusion
 Greater fiscal coordination and reinforced dis-
cipline will not stop the capital from flowing across 
national borders. Even if the governments of the tra-
ditional high interest-rate countries like Ireland, Italy, 
Greece, Portugal, and Spain do not borrow the mon-
ey, the banks and businesses in their societies will. 
This is the lesson from Ireland, Spain and Portugal. 
Greece is the exception that proves the rule. These 
other countries suffered from the sovereign debt cri-
sis because their private – and not public – borrowers 
were so heavily exposed. As these borrowers got cut 
out of international markets, the national governments 
had to step in to act as domestic lenders of last resort. 
What started as private indebtedness rapidly became 
a public concern. One need only look to Ireland to see 
that a history of fiscal austerity provides insufficient 
preparation to reconcile the dilemma posed by capital 
inflows from abroad.
 For all that the Van Rompuy Task Force is 
failing to shore up the single currency, a break up of 
the monetary union followed by national currency de-
preciations would not be the answer either. Without 
heroic efforts to constrain relative movements in real 
unit labor costs (like that witnessed in Ireland and Italy 
during the run-up to monetary union), price inflation 
would most likely overshoot any improvements in the 
nominal effective exchange rate (as happened in Por-
tugal and Greece) and competitiveness would con-
tinue to deteriorate – perhaps even at a faster pace. 
Meanwhile, the current accounts of the depreciating 
countries would only return to balance once traders in 
the bond markets factored in the cost of depreciation 
on their investments and lost faith in the eventual con-
vergence of national interest rates on German norms. 
In such a situation, current accounts would adjust as 
capital markets went into a rout. Of course this pros-
pect raises the hope that the resulting depreciation 
would overshoot the subsequent rise in inflation rates 
– and so trigger relative competitiveness gains – but 
the pace of adjustment would be brutal and the do-
mestic costs profound.
 A strong eurozone is still better than the alter-
native. The problem with the Van Rompuy Task Force’s 
proposals is that the euro could be made stronger still. 
If traditionally export-led growth countries could be 
convinced to invest and consume more at home, their 
banks and other financial institutions would have less 
interest in sending money in search of higher yields 
abroad. The cost would be felt in terms of marginally 
higher rates of inflation but the result would be a more 
balanced pattern of growth. Greater fiscal discipline 
would be useful as a flanking policy for such mea-
sures. But austerity in the periphery will have little ef-
fect operating on its own. This is the lesson from the 
recent sovereign debt crisis in Europe – but it is admit-
tedly a hard lesson to sell to a public opinion that has 
been shaped by tales of profligate governments and 
lazy public sector workers. Hence, the more powerful 
lesson from history appears to be that history is con-
demned to repeat itself, if not precisely, then at least 
enough to rhyme.
Erik Jones, SAIS Bologna Center of the 
Johns Hopkins University
Notes
1. This assessment is based on a wide range of source 
material that I do not cite in this essay due to space con-
straints. That should not be taken to mean a lack of intellec-
tual indebtedness. On the contrary, my views of have been 
shaped by a number of prominent writers – Martin Wolf, 
Vitor Gaspar and Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas chief among 
them. I have been developing these views over the past 
two years through a series of articles, book chapters, brief-
ing notes and other publications. Rather than provide an 
extensive bibliography in this essay – which is essentially a 
long opinion piece – I would refer you to those other works, 
which can be accessed from my personal website at http://
www.jhubc.it/facultypages/ejones. Please note that all of the 
data used in this essay is taken from the AMECO database 
published by the European Commission. The list of relevant 
data codes and revision dates can be made available upon 
request.
EUSA members interested in reviewing re-
cent EU-related books, please contact the 
reviews editor:
Dr. Amie Kreppel
Center for European Studies
3324 Turlington Hall PO 117342
University of Florida
Gainesville Florida 32611-7342, USA
Kreppel@ces.ufl.edu
Publishers should send two review copies
of books directly to Dr. Kreppel.
18     Fall 2010  EUSA Review
EUSA Teaching the EU
Interest Section
Teaching tools in EU studies and 
Social Networking 
Stefania Baroncelli and Roberto Farneti
 The emergence of the EU as a new actor in 
international politics has challenged treasured as-
sumptions and frameworks in both academia and 
policymaking. The EU was considered an entirely 
new and unique political system. Plus, it did not seem 
to fit the existing frameworks of either political theory 
or policy analysis. Institutional ambiguity was consid-
ered its most noticeable featured, that made the EU 
scarcely suitable to the analytical instruments of both 
canonical political science and other cognate disci-
plines such as Law, Economics, and History. Accord-
ing to Sergio Fabbrini the EU is a supranational polity 
with a necessary degree of institutional ambiguity […] 
Practitioners as well as specialists of the EU ended 
up considering the EU as a polity without precedent, 
for the modalities of both its formation and function-
ing, in the history of the democratic world” (Fabbrini, 
p. 203).
 Within academia, scholars from different disci-
plines have tried hard to create a new space in which 
the rather distinctive pattern of governance, the politi-
cal process, and the institutional actors involved in the 
EU could be possibly articulated into a coherent dis-
course. The challenge consisted in finding a suitable 
analytical discourse that could help make sense of 
an allegedly unique political system. EU studies (ES) 
thrived within this new space, thanks to the coopera-
tion among different disciplines. ES straddle boundar-
ies and constitute a novel area of interest in which 
a new, and possibly unique, object could eventually 
be framed. The novelty and uniqueness of the object, 
though, challenged not only the cohesion of the disci-
plines involved in addressing the academic discourse 
about the EU but also, and primarily, the teaching of 
ES.
 This article wants to outline briefly the results 
of a major research project on the current status and 
actual developments in teaching EU studies. It will 
offer insights into the major orientations in design-
ing teaching tools and methods and will survey, very 
much in outline, the current state of ES across disci-
plines. We will first detail the accomplishments of this 
project, then we will narrow the focus of our atten-
tion to our research, a group of teachers and students 
from the University of Bolzano. We will conclude on a 
brief description of case-study, namely, the application 
of social networks for classroom purposes.
The SENT Network
 The “Network of European Studies” (SENT) 
brought together 66 partners from EU member states, 
candidate countries, and a number of associate ones. 
It was an ambitious, far reaching project that aimed to 
assess the current state of EU studies and review the 
general perception of EU institutions across Europe.1 
The challenge faced by EU educational institutions is 
how to track and harmonize different curricula, how 
to facilitate inter-institutional cooperation and mobility 
schemes, and how to create integrated programs of 
study, training, and research. The SENT network was 
designed to meet these challenges and provide EU 
educators with a workable means of cooperation.
 The SENT network was created after the so-
called “Bologna Declaration,” a soft-law instrument 
that enabled policy-makers and national politicians in 
charge of higher education to harmonize the structure 
of the different educational systems within the EU, and 
set up new strategies of cooperation. The network was 
designed to meet the need of EU educational insti-
tutions to track and harmonize different curricula, to 
facilitate inter-institutional cooperation and mobility 
schemes, and to create integrated programs of study, 
training, and research.
 The network covered all possible areas in the 
formats, techniques and methodologies of teaching 
and learning EU studies, but particular emphasis was 
laid on innovative teaching tools, notably the use of 
technology in the classroom, simulations, and social 
networks. 
 Another important concern in the mind of the 
educators involved in teaching ES—a concern that 
needs to be taken in close consideration in designing 
new teaching tools—was multilingualism. It has been 
part of Community policy from the time of the Trea-
ties of Rome, and following the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992, the promotion of language learning became a 
corner stone of the EU’s educational policy. Now it is 
of special importance for the Lisbon Agenda. In 2006, 
the EU Parliament decided to pursue a comprehen-
sive “Framework Strategy for multilingualism“ with 
suggestions made by a group of experts for language 
learning and teaching and bi- and multilingual univer-
sities in Europe are experiencing a constant growth 
and strengthening. Such a reconfiguration of the Eu-
ropean educational scenario opens up a whole area 
of investigation as regards language pedagogy issues 
and the relationship between which discipline is taught 
and what languages are used. 
 This evolution, coupled with the traditional 
EUSA Review    Fall 2010  19 
vocation of the European Union in eliminating physi-
cal and intellectual barriers among countries, would 
strengthen the assumption that EU studies distin-
guish themselves for being based on multilingualism, 
intercultural and interdisciplinary approaches. Such 
hypothesis would be consonant with the new learn-
ing concepts, which are based, inter alia, on informal 
skills. If this assumption were true EU studies could be 
considered as an entirely new paradigm for teaching 
in European higher Education.
 In the following we shall present first, very 
much in outline, the main orientations and trends in in-
novative teaching tools in ES and introduce the activi-
ties and achievements of one particular group within 
the SENT network, the “Bolzano group.”
The Bolzano group
 SENT’s double mission was to survey and 
evaluate existing methods and practices in teaching 
and learning ES and to envision new methods and 
tools for teaching EU institutions. So, the project had a 
descriptive component (surveying the state of the art) 
and a normative one, tightly related with one another. 
The goal of the SENT was not so much to design new 
teaching pattern but rather pick out and highlight valu-
able experiences across countries and disciplines that 
could be disseminated and made accessible in other 
academic contexts. Simulation games, project teach-
ing, virtual teaching units, distance based learning and 
the use of social networks have been used spasmodi-
cally within the composite field of ES. Furthermore, 
having ES developed across countries with distinct 
and specific educational systems and mores, the 
SENT offered a valuable opportunity to explore the ad-
vantages and the main challenges posed by distance 
learning compared to traditional teaching methods. 
Problem-Based Learning (PBL) is a student-centered 
approach in which students collaboratively solve prob-
lems in small groups with the help of a tutor. The use 
of simulations, especially in political science curricula 
has proved to be particularly effective, and a project 
named the Trans-Atlantic Consortium for European 
Union Studies & Simulations (TACEUSS) is support-
ing developments in teaching patterns that foster the 
use of simulations.
 Within the broader framework of the SENT net-
work, the “Bolzano group” has aimed to identify the 
most significant and innovative teaching tools (at the 
University level) and to pin down the “special status” 
of EU studies compared with other subjects.2  The 
Bolzano group has mapped and reviewed EU studies 
across a number of disciplines (e.g. Economics, Law, 
Political Science, History and Social & Cultural Stud-
ies) by means of an on-line questionnaire sent to more 
than 2000 University professors committed to teach-
ing ES all over Europe taken from the various disci-
plines (political science and international relations, 
law, economics, history, and cultural studies), we tried 
to ascertain whether this assumption were true.3  Re-
spondents (professors of EU studies across the dis-
ciplines) were asked to provide general information 
about the course and give specific answers concerning 
the methods and approaches in EU studies. In order 
to verify how the different teaching methods followed 
different patterns in different countries we developed 
several hypotheses which helped us analyse data and 
disclose regional biases. The objective was to deter-
mine (among other things) which teaching methods 
were most popular with respect to discipline and coun-
try; whether there is a correlation between the use of 
language and the discipline, and whether (and to what 
extent) the syllabi cut across different disciplines.
 Admittedly, the elements of novelty and inno-
vation were critical to the project of finding for ES a 
specific domain and rationale. It is, again, the novelty 
and uniqueness of the institution addressed by ES 
that demands a new approach in the classroom. The 
simple re-use of tested teaching tools in new contexts 
would hardly generate fresh knowledge on EU insti-
tutions. What is at stake is indeed the creation of a 
discourse, within negotiable disciplinary boundaries, 
that could assist the teacher in framing the EU. In a 
way, the objective of the Bolzano group, and the SENT 
network as a whole, was to avoid, or possibly redress, 
biases produced by the use of frameworks and cat-
egories that were foreign to the facts to which they 
were brought to bear. It was, in other words, the use of 
American handbooks of Political Science that gener-
ated biases and distortions that often reverberated in 
the classroom. 
Using Facebook in class
One of the accomplishments of the Bolzano group 
was the bringing of social networks (such as Face-
book or Twitter) to bear on the teaching. Our interest 
in this kind of tools picks up on the experience with 
discussion forums illustrated in Robert H. Trudeau, 
“Get Them to Read, Get Them to Talk: Using Discus-
sion Forums to Enhance Student Learning” Journal of 
Political Science Education 1 (2005). 
 An electronic forum was run through the social 
network Facebook (FB), where most students of the 
University of Bozen/Bolzano have a personal page. It 
was the University itself, in 2008, that set up a Univer-
sity account on FB to provide students and teachers 
with a forum for informal discussion on issues pertain-
ing academic life. Not only the students but also a 
number of teachers set up their own pages and used 
20     Fall 2010  EUSA Review
them for more or less informal communication with ei-
ther colleagues or fellow-students.
 The forum was set up for the Comparative 
Politics class, where instead of having transcripts or 
a mid-term the Professor opted for a different medium 
for evaluating students’ proficiency, a medium more 
suitable to the normative implications of a subject for 
the study of which a good deal of attention was devot-
ed to processes of democratization. In our FB forum 
students were invited to contribute entries in response 
to a prompt that the instructor posted at the end of 
each week of class. Students, this was the idea, would 
write something about politics, but they would also en-
gage in discussion and ideas-exchange. A Teaching 
Assistant set up the page and managed the forum as 
its “administrator”; students were divided in 4 groups 
of 10 or 11 each, and invited to post three entries to 
the forum.
 Creating a forum of discussion through Face-
book could help to frame a debate on a variety of polit-
ical issues. This ‘debate’ prompted students to engage 
in the normative task of evaluating moral and political 
standards with currency in contemporary democratic 
political discourse and practice.
 The design of the electronic forum stressed 
the element of simulation (of democratic debate) as 
well as the normative element involved in debating 
issues that cannot be explained in merely empirical 
terms. Social networks, to be sure, are playing an ever 
more important role in our global world. Within the EU 
millions of people have the chance of exchanging 
views over a number of subjects concerning their sta-
tus as democratic citizens. This electronic forum had a 
double rationale. On the one hand, it helped students 
figure out the normative implications of the study of 
politics. By means of debate and discussion, students 
engaged in testing and checking the normative validity 
of political concepts. On the other hand, students were 
reminded that social networks, outside the classroom, 
are not neutral media, but rather political tools. Stu-
dents engaged in the normative practice of debating 
over a number of issues, and simulated, so to speak, 
the political dialectics explored in our lectures on the 
use of social networks in non- as well as emerging 
democracies.
 A relatively informal exchange, combined with 
a classroom simulation of political debate, were the 
ingredients of this experiment in innovative teaching 
methods. Students were invited to contribute three en-
tries in response to a prompt posted at the end of each 
week of class. The challenge was to walk the thin line 
between expressing their personal views and actual 
policy analysis.
Conclusions
 The Bolzano group will apply to present its 
accomplishments at the Boston EUSA conference 
in March 2011. If accepted, the panel will be open to 
other contributors interested in innovative teaching 
tools, orientations, and methods. The aim of the panel 
is to present the results of an important section of the 
SENT network, to illustrate the results afforded by the 
questionnaire, to receive feedback and commentary 
from other panel members, and to build with partners 
across the Atlantic a platform for future cooperation 
with possible spillover effects on the teaching of EU 
studies inside and outside Europe.
Stefania Baroncelli and Roberto Farneti
Free University of Bozen
Notes
1 The responsible of the entire SENT project is Federiga 
Bindi, Ph.D., University of Tor Vergata, Rome.
2 The Bolzano group is headed by Stefania Baroncelli, 
Associate Professor of Public Law at the Free University 
of Bozen/Bolzano (FUB). A founding member of the group 
is Federico Boffa, a former Assistant Professor at the FUB, 
now Associate Professor of Economics at the University of 
Macerata. The group was later joined by Roberto Farneti, 
Assistant Professor of Politics at the FUB and by Gordana 
Stevancevic, a graduate student of the School of Eco-
nomics and Management of the FUB. Two more students 
joined the group by assisting Roberto Farneti in framing 
the Facebook forum for his Comparative Politics class, 
Irene Bianchi and Johannes Niederhauser.
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EU Studies.
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The Legal Response to the Financial 
Crisis in Europe1
Chiara Zilioli
 Between August 2008 and today, the financial 
world has gone through what was initially qualified 
as “financial turmoil”, then “financial crisis”, then “the 
worst financial crisis since the ‘30s” until when, cer-
tainly in Europe, the threat of sovereign default and 
the challenge to the single European currency became 
the most worrying aspect of it. 
 Until now, the financial crisis has been fought 
quite successfully in Europe by (i) the Member States, 
through the introduction of national legislative mea-
sures aiming at restoring the solidity of credit institu-
tions and the confidence of the citizens in the banking 
sector, also through the issuance of State guarantees, 
(ii) the European Central Bank and the Eurosystem, 
through a combination of measures that amounted in 
practice to increasing access to liquidity for the mar-
ket participants, (iii) the European Union (EU) institu-
tions, through the establishment of new instruments 
(a fund able to assist Member States in distress, bi-
lateral loans, measures monitoring, and intervening 
in, national fiscal and economic policy rules) and new 
bodies (dealing with prudential supervision and over-
sight). 
 This article will neither deal with the national 
legislative measures,2  nor with the crucial contribution 
given by the ECB and the Eurosystem to financial sta-
bility by ensuring, through different instruments, the li-
quidity in the market.3  It will instead focus on the main 
steps taken by the European legislators (European 
Council, Ecofin Council, Parliament and Commission) 
to react to these events and prevent their recurrence. 
1. Background: four important points on the 
institutional structure of the European Union
 To fully understand the way in which the Euro-
pean Union and its Member States were affected by 
the financial crisis and are reacting to it, one has to 
have clear in mind the EU complex structure. 
 First, the European Union is composed by 27 
Member States, which apply common rules, dealing in 
particular with the free movement of capital: no legal 
obstacle can exist to the transfer of capital and the 
investment of funds across borders. 
 Secondly, of these 27 Member States, 16 
(soon 174) of them have adopted a common currency, 
the euro. These 16 States (the Euroarea) no longer 
have a national currency, nor a national monetary or 
exchange rate policy: it is the European Central Bank 
(ECB) that, according to the Treaty of the European 
Union, adopts monetary policy decisions for the whole 
Euroarea and governs the Eurosystem, composed of 
the ECB and the national central banks (NCBs) of the 
Member States that have adopted the euro. These na-
tional central banks, whose governors are members 
in a personal capacity of the Governing Council of the 
ECB, have the task to implement the decisions of the 
ECB through operations in their legal system. The oth-
er 11 Member States continue to be sovereign in their 
currency and monetary policy decisions.
 Thirdly, the Treaty has not conferred upon the 
ECB (nor upon another EU body) supervisory pow-
ers over financial institutions. This power continues 
therefore to be exercised at national level, sometimes 
by the central bank, sometimes by one or more spe-
cialised national supervisory institutions. Credit institu-
tions established somewhere in the European Union, 
instead, operate in a completely transboundary man-
ner.
 Finally, among the 16 euro area Member 
States that have a common monetary and exchange 
rate policy there is neither a common economic policy, 
nor a common fiscal policy. The “Stability and Growth 
Pact” has been adopted to impose a peer monitoring 
and even to sanction those States that would not re-
spect the obligation imposed by the Treaty to avoid in-
curring excessive government deficits, as these, in the 
long term, may have negative effects on the common 
currency and on the other Member Stares. This Pact 
has proven not to be effective, also due to the water-
ing down of its rules few years ago.5 As a result, broad 
differences in the national economic fundamentals ex-
ist among euro area Member States. Lately, when the 
financial crisis strongly impacted on sovereign debt, 
these unbalances in the Economic and Monetary 
Union construction became more critical. 
2. European initiatives to improve 
financial stability
 Immediately after the beginning of the crisis, a 
lacuna became blatantly visible: the lacuna relating to 
the supervision of financial markets. The absence of 
a European supervisor, sharply in constrast with the 
fact that the main credit institutions have today a pan-
European reach, was to be blamed for some specific 
“crises” within the crisis: different applicable rules and 
lack of information and communication among na-
tional supervisors about the financial situation of credit 
institution on the other side of the border had made it 
impossible to realise how bad, in some cases, the situ-
ation was. In addition, it became clear that no institu-
tion was in charge of macroprudential oversight, deal-
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ing with risks developing across countries and across 
financial sectors from the common exposure of many 
financial institutions to the same risk factors, indepen-
dently from specific risks or weaknesses of a specific 
financial institution. 
 On the basis of the de Larosière Report,6 is-
sued on 25 February 2009, the Commission prepared 
five Regulations addressing the shortcomings that 
have been identified and establishing the new archi-
tecture for financial supervision in Europe. On 23 Sep-
tember 2010 these legal acts have been adopted by 
the European Council and Parliament.7   
 According to these rules, on 1 January 2011 
the “European System of Financial Supervision” 
(ESFS) will be established, consisting of a European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), with macroprudential 
oversight tasks, and three European Supervisory Au-
thorities (ESAs) for the financial services sector: the 
European Banking Authority (EBA) based in London, 
the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA) in Frankfurt and the European Se-
curities and Markets Authority (ESMA) in Paris, that 
will have micro-prudential supervisory tasks. 
 The three Authorities will be made up of the 27 
national supervisors and, working in a network, and 
in tandem with these national authorities, will focus 
on individual financial firms to ensure their financial 
soundness and protect consumers. They have been 
given the power to draw up rules for national authori-
ties and financial institutions and to develop techni-
cal standards, the beginning of a European rulebook; 
they can take action and intervene directly in case of 
emergencies declared by the EU Council, also by tem-
porarily restricting or prohibiting certain financial activ-
ites that threaten the stability of the financial market; 
they have the direct supervisory power on credit rating 
institutions, but they have not been given the power 
to directly supervise transboudary credit institutions, 
the control over which remains fragmented among the 
various national authorities (even though, within the 
new System, a much closer work relation among them 
is envisioned and the ESAs have a mediation role in 
case of disagreement among national supervisors). 
 The fourth entity of the System, the European 
Systemic Risk Board, is to be established in Frankfurt 
and has the task of macroprudential oversight, i.e. to 
prevent or mitigate systemic risk within the financial 
system. It cooperates closely with the three ESAs and 
exchanges information with them; it can issue warn-
ings and recommendations addressed to the EU in-
stitutions, the Member States, European or national 
supervisory authorities8 and it shall follow up on the 
compliance with these recommendations and warn-
ings. It is chaired by the ECB President and composed 
by 36 voting members (27 of which are governors of 
national central banks) and 28 non-voting members 
(mainly respresentatives of the national supervisory 
institutions).9
 The establishment of the ESFS is undoubtedly 
a qualitative step forward to fill in the gaps that were 
detected during the crisis. The important role given to 
central banks in the macro-prudential oversight for Eu-
rope confirms the high esteem tributed by the govern-
ments to independent central banks, and to the ECB 
in particular as one of the main actors of the success-
ful reaction to the crisis. The doubt remains whether, 
for the legislator, taking a more energic step in the 
direction of a European Supervisory Authority would 
not have been a more effective move than the newly 
created structure, composed of complex bodies with 
so many members that, in a conflict or crisis situation, 
it will not be easy to take executive decisions.  It has 
often been repeated by the opponents to a European 
supervisory authority that, as in an emergency it is for 
the national government (in the last end, the national 
tax-payers) to bail out its own banks, there cannot be 
a shared or delegated reponsibility for supervision, 
and this is the reason why the reform stopped short of 
a European supervisor. In reality, this comment draws 
the attention to another need, the need for creating an 
insurance system, supported by a tax payed by the 
financial operators, to avoid national tax-payers hav-
ing to cover unexpected losses arising despite a well 
exercised prudential supervision. The creation of such 
a scheme should be prioritised; once in place, this 
would also clear the way from the political consider-
ations against a European Supervisor, which is clearly 
needed for pan-european credit institutions, financial 
operators and infrastructures. 
 Despite these shortcomings what has been 
achieved through this reform is certainly positive. Now 
it is of the essence to put all the energy in avoiding 
heavy structures and politicisation paralyse the effec-
tiveness of the new bodies, and to enable the ESFS to 
do its highly complex technical work properly, starting 
the January 1, 2011.
3. European initiatives to support a distressed 
Euroarea Member State 
 At the beginning of 2010 the financial crisis 
turned in Europe into a “sovereign default risk phase” 
and this created a lot of preoccupation around the 
world. For the first time there was the real risk of a de-
veloped country becoming insolvent. For the first time 
the country under attack did not have an own currency 
but a common currency, the euro: this meant that, on 
the one hand, the country could not use some of the 
instruments which could have limited the damage (in 
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particular devaluation of the currency) while, on the 
other hand, an insolvency could have had dramatic 
consequences for the States sharing the same cur-
rency, for the very existence of the euro and, even, 
for the European Union itself. This situation drew at-
tention to the shortcomings of the fiscal policy coordi-
nation arrangements in the EU mentioned above and 
highlighted the importance of reflecting on how best to 
proceed in order to avoid a repeat (non) performance 
in the future. 
 That a problem existed became clear at the 
beginning of 2010. For a while, Greece managed to 
collect on the market the funds it needed while tack-
ling, under pressure from the other Member States, its 
public debt problem. On May 1, after the ECB and the 
Commission had concluded that Greece had insuffi-
cient market access for the financing of its obligations, 
it became clear that the week-end would have been a 
decisive one: strong action was needed from all sides. 
In the early morning of Monday, May 2, a solution was 
agreed and a very strong signal was given to the mar-
kets that the European Union and its Member States 
were ready to go a long way to protect the Monetary 
Union and their currency. The Euro Group agreed on 
a package to support Greece, conditional upon the 
introduction of economic and fiscal measures in that 
Member State: under these conditions, a support up 
to 500 million euro via bilateral loans from the other 
15 Euroarea Member States, centrally pooled by the 
Commission, was activated.
 On 10 May this agreement was implemented 
through the adoption of three important legal instru-
ments.10 First, the EU Council addressed a Decision 
to Greece with a view to reinforcing and deepening 
fiscal surveillance and giving notice to Greece to take 
measures for the deficit reduction judged necessary 
to remedy its excessive deficit situation.11 The Deci-
sion sets out the main elements of policy condition-
ality for the granting of that support; is unparalleled 
both in its prescriptiveness and in its level of detail. 
It could become a precedent for future EU interven-
tions in the fiscal policies of Member States that do 
not observe their commitments under the Stability and 
Growth Pact (SGP) in case of a Euroarea Member 
State in distress. It could even be the beginning of an 
enhanced EU  economic policy coordination. 
 Secondly, the ECOFIN Council adopted a Reg-
ulation12 establishing a ‘European Financial Stabilisa-
tion Mechanism’: a fund capable of extending financial 
assistance, in instalments, to troubled Member States 
(not only of the Euroarea but also of the EU), in the 
form of a loan (to be repaid with interest) or a credit 
line.13 The Council decides upon its activation, acting 
by qualified majority on a proposal from the Commis-
sion after hearing the views of the ECB.14 Its funds 
are to be secured by way of borrowing on the capital 
markets or from financial institutions, up to the amount 
of 60 billion euros, to be raised by the European Com-
mission, acting for the EU. 
 Finally, the ECOFIN Council decided that the 
‘European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism’ was to 
be complemented by a so-called ‘European Financial 
Stability Facility’, in the form of an SPV, a separate 
legal entity to be established by way of an Intergovern-
mental Agreement among Euroarea Member States, 
which could provide a further 440 billion euros in fi-
nancial assistance to Member States facing a liquidity 
crisis in the market for its government debt. To access 
the ‘Facility’, Member States would first need to agree 
on a macroeconomic adjustment programme with the 
Commission and the Eurogroup, in liaison with the 
ECB and, depending on the circumstances, also the 
IMF. The Eurogroup would retain its decision-making 
responsibility with regard in particular to the evalua-
tion of conditionality and the authorisation of disburse-
ments. The ‘Facility’ would issue bonds on the market 
using pro rata basis guarantees by all Euroarea Mem-
ber States who would commit upfront to their total 
share of 440 billion and provide loans at interest rates 
determined on the basis of a pricing formula consistent 
with the lending rates of the IMF. The obligation of the 
euro area Member States to issue guarantees entered 
into force on 4 August 2010, when the guarantee com-
mitments of the euro area Member States to the EFSF 
reached more than 90% of the total amount. The facil-
ity is now authorised to issue bonds in the market with 
the help of Finanzagentur, the German Debt Office. 
4. Conclusion
 The EU has fought the financial crisis through 
three main actions, ensuring the provision of liquid-
ity to markets, establishing a European Supervisory 
framework, creating instruments to support a member 
State in distress and tightening the controls on that 
State’s fiscal policy soundness. These new measures 
are qualitative steps towards deepening integration in 
the EU, and have proven to be effective in contain-
ing the crisis. Time will tell which oter steps might be 
needed. 
 What is certain is that Europe did not shy away 
from using its legal, political and economic tools with 
energy, creativity and flexibility, within the limits of the 
conferred powers, to fight and defend the European 
construction. This, in itself, is a very good piece of 
news for the future of Europe.
Chiara Zilioli
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sue. The authors set out four hypotheses that political 
scientists use to explain integration in the EU, labelled: 
intergovernmentalism, neofunctionalism, domestic 
politics and the role of experts. They come to an emi-
nently sensible conclusion that all factors have a role 
to play but that there relative importance varies over 
time. Anyone without a doctrinal axe to grind would 
have thought that beforehand. However the fact that 
they vary over time makes them rather more explana-
tory factors than theories. Other disciplines such as 
economics and geography offer hypotheses for both 
the enthusiasm for integration and the success with 
which it achieved. These theories discuss structures, 
systems, institutions, preferences etc. all of which 
seem to have explanatory power. It is a pity that political 
scientists resort to such an internecine world and that 
these two authors bother to put so much emphasis on 
these particular theories. Their pragmatic or what they 
describe as ‘eclectic’ approach makes plenty of sense 
in its own right and they could step away from these 
doctrinal disputes which offer little stimulus to the gen-
eral reader interested in the politics of the SGP. Since 
this discussion occurs first there is a real danger some 
readers will put the book down and not get on to the 
wealth of detail and useful insight that characterises 
the rest of the book. The aspects of the analysis that 
rely on questionnaires and interviews may prove con-
tentious but the authors have been thorough and this 
book is likely to remain a definitive exposition of this 
interesting period. The EU under the SGP has been 
an improvement of the previous period without it but 
unless something better replaces the weakened post 
2003 system the outlook for fiscal sustainability does 
not look good. The authors are quite upbeat about the 
continuation of the Pact itself in the future despite the 
challenges (p.204) but their discussions are specula-
tive and they do not attempt to look at the projections 
that have been made by the Commission or the IMF, 
which give an idea of the extent of action required, 
which in the case of Greece, Italy, Portugal, Ireland 
and Spain is harsher than anything required under the 
SGP thus far.
 
David G. Mayes, University of Auckland
Book Reviews
Martin Heipertz and Amy Verdun. Ruling Europe: the 
Politics of the Stability and Growth Pact. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010.
 This book has two main purposes. The first is 
to provide a review of the main theories that political 
scientists use for explaining European integration, us-
ing the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) as a case 
study. The second is to provide a detailed exposition of 
the initial steps taken on the way to forming the Pact, 
the problem period for the Pact in and around 2003, 
its process of reformulation and it operation since the 
reformulation in 2005 and through to the early stages 
of the present crisis. There is thus an historical picture 
covering some 15 years of considerable debate. 
 The book is brilliantly successful in its second 
task. Anyone who wants to understand the thinking 
behind the SGP, what the major players did and how 
the various compromises were hammered out will 
want to use this book. It has a long and helpful Appen-
dix setting out the legislation covering the Pact and its 
revision as well as the judgements from the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) over the attempt by the Council 
to get round the Commission’s recommendations in 
2003. A simple contents list for the Appendix and a 
short readers’ guide would have made this valuable 
resource much more accessible. As a study of the pol-
itics involved in the SGP the coverage is thorough.
 If this excellent exposition of the events and 
the factors behind them had been accompanied by 
an analysis of what the SGP was intended to achieve 
and how well it had succeeded then the book would 
have covered in a single place what all readers are 
looking for. Clearly some extension of the work will be 
required when the EU emerges from the global finan-
cial crisis and passes through its first ‘normal’ down-
turn thereafter. The Pact has been strained in two ma-
jor respects. The first is that 15 years of hard work 
in fiscal consolidation has been blown and the fiscal 
position of many of the member states is now worse 
than it was before the struggle to qualify for Stage 3 
of EMU started. The second is that with such a se-
vere recession countries have been able to run very 
substantial structural deficits. The countries therefore 
face both a difficult problem of a long run path to sus-
tainable debt and a path of short run adjustment to 
get to equilibrium and stop the problems escalating. I 
look forward to seeing the authors’ analysis of these 
issues.
 The first objective of the book is a different is-
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Taylor, Paul. The End of European Integration. Anti-
Europeanism Examined. Routledge Press, 2007.
 
 Paul Taylor’s book covers a wide range of top-
ics, but generally takes “a hard, realistic look at the 
risks facing European integration” (1).  He begins by 
discussing the history of integration in terms of waxing 
and waning over time. Periods of waxing are jumps 
forward in integration while waning represents peri-
ods of status quo or reversal. The first half of the book 
maintains that the current state of affairs is represented 
by a long waning period following Maastricht in 1991 
and that hopes of transitioning to a period of enhanced 
cooperation and integration appear less likely. Taylor 
argues that the grand projects and conducive leader-
ship that had been successful in pushing integration 
forward in the past are no longer characteristics of the 
21st century European Union.  
 Taylor emphasizes three elements in the wan-
ing of integration: enlargement, goals, and consen-
sus. The inclusion of Britain in 1973 is argued to have 
increasingly worked against European integration 
through their consistent support and pursuit of balanc-
ing returns and their push for subsidiarity.  In terms of 
goals, the problem is that there is no clear next step. 
Where many of the other periods were sustained by an 
overarching goal, there seems to be less agreement 
on what the next step should be. Consensus relates to 
the first two in that more actors cannot agree on new 
goals. The days of the permissive consensus seem to 
be over and the next step in integration will always be 
more contested than in the past. Taylor links this to the 
success of anti-EU coalitions, particularly in Britain.
The second half of the book is a more forward looking, 
solutions oriented approach. Noting that previous re-
coveries often hinged on grand projects, he assesses 
possible ways forward. One is for the EU to become 
both a soft and a hard power in the international realm. 
That means defense mechanisms as well as clear 
representation in international bodies. A chapter on 
the EU in international bodies highlights the issue of 
not being able to collectively act in other international 
organizations. The reader can’t help but wonder how 
far the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty will go to 
solve the ills that Taylor perceives on this dimension.
 The final chapters of the book are billed as a 
way forward with “a new European Project” (147). He 
suggests the consistent application of rules and val-
ues in the process of enlargement, increasing defense 
mechanisms, and increasing the role of social policy 
as goals to move Europe into a new waxing phase. 
While the author admits that these have been on the 
agenda for some time, it is through these paths that 
further integration must pass. In the end, however, 
Taylor remains skeptical that the 21st century EU will 
move beyond its role as “a facilitator of enterprise” and 
overcome the judgment that “it failed to develop inter-
national power” (167). 
 This book represents well a trajectory of Euro-
pean integration, but recent events necessarily con-
front research.  Will scholars look back and see the 
completion of the Central and East European enlarge-
ment and the completion of the Lisbon treaty as evi-
dence that the EU was able to overcome anti-Europe-
an forces that caused the waning described by Taylor? 
We must wait for such answers but Taylor’s book still 
represents a well rounded, pragmatic account of Eu-
rope in the 21st century. 
Tristan Vellinga, University of Florida
Interested in serving as a “Guest Editor” for 
the EUSA Review? 
If so send a proposal, including the thematic topic 
to be addressed, potential forum authors (2-3), 
as well as a list of 3-4 related recently published 
books for the book review section, to Amie Kreppel 
(kreppel@ufl.edu). Please use the phrase “EUSA 
Review Guest Editor Proposal” as the subject line. 
Representatives from the various official EUSA inter-
est Sections are especially encouraged to consider 
guest editorship.
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2011 EUSA PRIZES 
2011 EUSA Haas Fund Fellowship Competition 
The 2009-2011 EUSA Executive Committee is pleased to announce the 2011 EUSA Haas Fund 
Fellowship Competition, an annual fellowship for graduate student EU-related dissertation research. 
Thanks entirely to contributions to our Ernst Haas Memorial Fund for EU Studies, launched in June 
2003 to honor the memory of the late scholar Ernst B. Haas (1924-2003) we will offer at least one 
unrestricted fellowship of $1,500 to support the dissertation research of any graduate student pursuing 
an EU-related dissertation topic in the academic year 2010-2011. 
Please note the following stipulations for applicants, who must: 
• be pursuing the doctoral degree (PhD) at an accredited institution in any country; 
• be writing a dissertation in English; 
• have an EU-related, doctoral dissertation topic approved by the professor who will supervise it; and, 
• be able to demonstrate clearly the relevance to EU studies of the dissertation topic. 
Applicants for this Fellowship should submit: 
(1) A one-page letter of application that specifies how the fellowship would be used; 
(2) A CV;  
(3) A (500 words) précis of the dissertation research project that also explains its relevance to EU studies; and, 
(4) Ask for two letters of support to be sent directly to EUSA. These letters should be from professors 
serving on the student’s dissertation committee, and one should be the chair. 
Please send applications to eusa@pitt.edu and use the heading “2011 E.B. Haas Fund Fellowship 
competition.” The firm deadline for applications to be received in the EUSA office is January 7, 2011. 
The successful applicant will be notified by February 15, 2011 at the latest, and will receive the grant 
soon thereafter. The fellowship will be paid in one lump sum by check and in US dollars only. 
EUSA Prize for Best Conference Paper 
The EUSA Prize for Best Conference Paper will be awarded in 2011 to an outstanding paper presented at the 2009 Biennial 
Conference in Los Angeles. All those who presented an original paper at the Conference are eligible, excepting persons who are 
current members of the EUSA Executive Committee and persons who have already won the EUSA Best Conference Paper Prize. The 
prize carries a cash award of $100. To submit a paper for consideration, send an electronic version in Microsoft Word to 
eusa@pitt.edu. Please put  “Best 2009 Conference Paper Prize” in the subject line. The deadline is January 7, 2011. 
EUSA Prize for Best Dissertation 
The EUSA Prize for Best Dissertation in EU studies will be awarded in 2011 to a dissertation written in English on any aspect of 
European integration between September 1, 2008 and August 31, 2010. The student must have defended and deposited the final 
dissertation and graduated (been awarded the PhD degree) during this period as well. Dissertations submitted for students who did not 
receive the PhD degree and graduate during the specified time period will be disqualified. Only one dissertation per department at an 
institution may be nominated for this prize. The prize carries a cash award of $250. Department chairs (not the dissertation committee 
chair) should submit an electronic copy in Microsoft Word of the dissertation with a short cover letter (letter of transmittal) from the 
chair to the EUSA Administrative Office at eusa@pitt.edu.  Please put “2011 Best Dissertation Prize” in the subject line. Dissertations 
that are not submitted by the department chair will be disqualified. The deadline is January 7, 2011. 
EUSA Book Prize 
The 2003-05 Executive Committee of the European Union Studies Association established the EUSA Book Prize, to be awarded at 
each biennial EUSA conference, for a book in English on any aspect of EU studies and published in the two years prior to the EUSA 
Conference. This prize carries a cash award of $US 300 to the author(s). For the 2011 EUSA Book Prize, to be awarded in Boston, 
books published in 2009 and 2010 will be eligible. Authors or publishers will submit three (hard) copies of the nominated book (with 
a letter of transmittal), one to each member of the EUSA Book Prize committee and a cover letter or email to the EUSA main office. 
(Nominated books may not be submitted by e-mail, as galleys or proofs, or in any form other than hard-copy published book.) The 
deadline for receipt of the books by the committee members is January 7, 2011.  The addresses of the committee members are: 
 
Amie Kreppel   Michele Chang 
Center for European Studies  Dept of European Political and Administrative Studies 
3324 Turlington Hall PO 117342  College of Europe  
University of Florida   Dijver 11   
Gainesville Florida 32611-7342 USA 8000 Brugge BELGIUM   
 
Joseph Jupille 
Department of Political Science  
Ketchum 106 , Campus box 333  
University of Colorado, Boulder  
Boulder, CO 80309-0333 USA 
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The latest in European Union Studies from
 OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 
Policy-Making in the European Union
Sixth Edition
EDITED BY Helen Wallace, Mark A. Pollack, and Alasdair R. Young
The policies of the European Union profoundly a ect the lives of people in Europe and 
around the world. The new edition of this highly successful textbook outlines how and 
why such decisions are made, as well as the key challenges faced by policy-makers in 
the current political and economic climate. 
Policy-Making in the European Union begins by clarifying the institutional framework 
of the EU and the analytical approaches used to understand it. A wide range of crucial 
and illustrative policies are then explored in detail by subject experts. 
The sixth edition is fully up-to-date, including a discussion of the recent fi nancial and 
economic crises, and is the ideal text for all those with an interest in the policy-making 
of the European Union.
2010  |  648 pp.
978-0-19-954482-0  |  paper  |  $45.00
European Union Politics
Third Edition
EDITED BY Michelle Cini and Nieves Pérez-Solórzano Borragán
2010  |  530 pp.
978-0-19-954863-7  |  paper  |  $49.95
Europeanism
John McCormick
2010  |  272 pp.
978-0-19-955621-2  |  cloth  |  $49.95
The Narcissism of Minor Di erences
How America and Europe are Alike
Peter Baldwin
2009  |  336 pp.
978-0-19-539120-6  |  cloth  |  $24.95
An Emergent European Executive Order
Jarle Trondal
2010  |  320 pp.
978-0-19-957942-6  |  cloth  |  $85.00
International Law for 
International Relations
Basak Çali
2010  |  480 pp.
978-0-19-955842-1  |   paper  |  $47.95
3
New Edition! 
New Edition! 
Prices are subject to change and apply only in the U.S. To order or for more information, call 
1-800-451-7556. In Canada, call 1-800-387-8020  Visit our website at www.oup.com/us
The Theory of Multi-Level Governance
Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges
Simona Piattoni
2010  |  320 pp.
978-0-19-956292-3  |  cloth  |  $95.00
